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The Appointments Clause, Innovative Federalism,
and the Constitutionality of the Northwest Power
Planning Council
Michael C. Blumm*
It is now clear that the Supreme Court is in the business of fashioning relatively bright lines that segregate congressional from executive functions. The Court has invoked these demarcations to reject
congressional appointment of officials exercising significant federal
executive authority,1 to invalidate legislative vetoes,2 and most recently, to scuttle congressional authorization of executive functions in
a legislative agent.' This vision of sharply separated powers has imposed important curbs on congressional oversight of policy implementation and may help to revitalize broad claims of executive autonomy that only a decade ago, in the wake of the demise of
unqualified assertions of executive privilege,4 seemed unlikely.
The Burger Court never considered the effect its concept of separation of powers might have on federal-state relations, an issue on
which Chief Justice Rehnquist holds strong views.5 The Ninth Circuit, however, recently confronted the crosscurrents between the horizontal division of federal powers and the vertical tensions of federalism in a case challenging the constitutionality of an interstate agency
with-congressionally authorized controls over federal officials. In Se* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School; LL.M. 1979, J.D. 1976, George Washington
University; B.A. 1972, Williams College. An earlier version of this Article appeared in Issue #36
of the Anadromous Fish Law Memo (July 1986), a publication of the Natural Resources Law
Institute produced under a grant from the Oregon State University Sea Grant College Program,
supported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), United States
Department of Commerce (Grant No. NA 81AA-D-0086). However, views expressed here are
the author's alone; they do not represent the views of either NOAA or the United States government. William Funk, Frank Ostrander, John Volkman, and especially Edward Brunet provided helpful comments. Maryhelen Sherrett, Lewis and Clark Law School Class of 1987, contributed valuable research assistance, while Helen Kennedy, Lewis and Clark Law School Class
of 1988, supplied editorial assistance.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
3 Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
1 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 579 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317 (1982).
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attle Master Builders' Ass'n v. Northwest Power Planning Council,6
the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Council against
an appointments clause attack. Subsequently, the Rehnquist Court
declined to clarify whether the emerging outline of executive autonomy that limits congressional involvement in executive functions also
runs against the states. The result may lead to other innovative federal-state responses to interjurisdictional problems that have eluded
federal solutions.
In particular, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the effect of the
compacts and appointments clauses on federal-state relations should
help Congress, the states, and other courts to design, implement, and
interpret other statutes designed to give states more influence over
pervasive transboundary issues.7 By affirming an unprecedented delegation of authority to the interstate Northwest Power Planning
Council, the Master Builders' decision may encourage similar federal-state power sharing arrangements to address intractable
problems such as "acid rain" pollution, ground and surface water allocation, and hazardous waste facility siting.
On a more parochial level, the court's affirmation of the constitutionality embodied in the 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest Power Act) s will foster
the twin congressional goals of promoting cost effective conservation
programs and electric power for the Pacific Northwest while preserving and restoring the region's fish and wildlife resources.' Had the
court ruled that Congress unconstitutionally authorized the Council
to control federal agency actions, achievement of these goals would
certainly have been delayed, perhaps undermined.
This Article examines the Ninth Circuit's decision and its regional
* Master Builders' 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 939 (1987). For
other perspective on the case, see Goble, The Council and the Constitution: An Article on the
Constitutionalityof the Northwest Power PlanningCouncil, 1 J. OF ENVTL. L. & LIT. 10 (1986);
Sherrett, Seattle Master Builders' Association v. Northwest Power Planning Council: The Constitutionality of the Northwest Experiment in Cooperative Federalism, 17 Er~vL. L. (forthcoming 1987).
See, e.g., Symposium on TransboundaryIssues in Natural Resources Law, 32 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1 (1983).
8 16 U.S.C. § 839-839h (1980).
' See generally Symposium on the Northwest Power Act, 13 ENVTL. L. nos. 3 and 4 (1983);
Symposium on Energy Issues in the Pacific Northwest, 58 WASH. L. REV. no. 2 (1983). On the
history of the Northwest's electric power system, see G. NORWOOD, COLUMBIA RIVER POWER FOR
THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF POLICIES OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION (1981); K. LEE,
D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, ELECTRIC POWER AND THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (1980);
Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175 (1983).
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and national implications. Section I places the suit in context by
briefly examining the statutory structure and administrative machinery established by the Northwest Power Act. Section II discusses the
statutory and constitutional arguments the Master Builders asserted
against the Council and its model conservation standards; section II
also portrays the dilemma of the intervenor, the Bonneville Power
Administration, a federal agency whose discretion the Council was
designed to constrain. Section III explores the reasoning of both the
majority and the dissenting opinions in the case, while Section IV
argues that the majority's result is sound even though its reasoning
may be shallow. Section IV also critizes the reasoning of the dissent
as oversimplistic and wooden. Section V contends that the Master
Builders' result is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Bowsher v. Synar,10 where the court struck down a key provision of
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction statute. The Article
concludes that the centrifugal forces promoted by the Northwest
Power Act's federal-state power sharing scheme are consistent both
with the intent of the Constitution's framers and with the demands
of public policymaking in the last decades of the Twentieth Century.

I.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Act

The 1980 Northwest Power Act 11 revolutionized electric power
policymaking in the Pacific Northwest. The Act mandated a cost effective, environmentally sound electric power system for the region."
Additionally, the Act authorized an unprecedented effort to preserve
and restore Columbia Basin fish and wildlife damaged by the development and operation of the chief component of the region's power
system, a series of interconnected federal and nonfederal dams." The
mechanisms for carrying out these policy changes are two plans developed by a new interstate entity authorized by the Act, the Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Council (the
Council). The Council promulgated its Columbia Basin Fish and
'0 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181.
16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1980).
§ 839b(e).
" Id. § 839b(h). The effect of the growth of the Northwest's hydroelectric system on the
Columbia Basin's economically valuable anadromous fish runs is traced in Blumm, Hydropower
vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's Anadromous Fish Runs For a Peaceful
Coexistence With the Federal Columbia River Power System, 11 ENVrL. L. 211 (1981).
14 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a).
"

" Id.
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Wildlife Program in 1982; 15 a year later it approved the Northwest
Conservation and Electric Power Plan. 6
The Council represents a novel experiment in federal-state relations. 17 Authorized by Congress in response to mounting concern of
the governors of Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington over the
relative lack of state control over regional electric policymaking,18 the
Northwest Power Act expressly declares that the Council is not a federal agency.1' Nevertheless, the Act empowers the Council to place
significant constraints on federal agencies, most notably the region's
federal wholesale power marketer, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). 0 Because the Council members hold their appointments
pursuant to state law,21 concerns over the constitutionality of giving
the Council authority over BPA surfaced even before Congress enacted the statute.22 Anticipating a constitutional challenge, Congress
16Northwest Power Planning Council, Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program (1982).
The program was substantially amended in 1984, and minor amendments were approved in
both 1985 and 1986. The program is critically evaluated in Blumm, Reexamining the Parity
Promise:More Challenges Than Successes to the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program,
16 ENVTL. L. 461 (1986); see also Blumm, Implementing the Parity Promise: An Evaluation of
the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 14 ENVrL. L. 277 (1984) [hereinafter Implementing Parity].
16 Northwest Power Planning Council, Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan
(1983). The plan was substantially revised in 1985.
1" See Hemmingway, The Northwest Power Planning Council: Its Origins and Future Role,
13 ENVTL. L. 673 (1983).
11On the origins of the Council, see id. at 678-80.
' 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2)(A)(iv). However, federal laws pertaining to contracting, conflicts of
interest, financial disclosure, open meetings, advisory committees, information disclosure, and
judicial review apply to the Council "for the purpose of providing a uniform system of laws."
Id. § 839b(a)(4).
10 See provisions cited infra notes 94-95.
2'16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2)(B) ("two persons from each State may be appointed, subject to the
applicable laws of each such State . . .").
" See Hemmingway, supra note 17, at 680-82 (discussing opinions of the U.S. Justice Department and the General Accounting Office). See also H.R. REP. No. (pt. II), 96th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 70 (supplemental views of Rep. Pat Williams), reprinted at 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5989, 6063 (emphasis added):
The amendment provides for Council members to be appointed by the Governors
rather than by the Secretary of Energy. Gubernatorialappointment will ensure regional control over regional power matters and will provide a more meaningful
check on the Bonneville Power Administrator.The Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Art. 2 § 2, cl. 2) has been raised as a possible impediment to State appointment of Council members. Careful constitutional research, however, shows that the
Congress may share with the states authorities such as those given to the Council.
The Appointments Clause relates to separationof powers between the branches of
the national government, not to mechanisms such as the Council, in which state
officials would be acting pursuant to state authority within the framework of a federal law.
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authorized the creation of a federal Council, to be appointed by the
Secretary of Energy, in the event a court struck down the nonfederal
Council."
The seeds of the expected constitutional challenge were sown when
the Council promulgated its Northwest Conservation and Electric
Power Plan in November 1983.24 The Act required the plan to include "model conservation standards applicable to new and existing
structures", and utility, industrial, and conservation programs.2 5 Congress specified that these standards must (1) reflect geographic and
climatic differences, (2) be "cost effective" for the region, and (3) be
"economically feasible" for consumers.2 6
The Act authorized the Council to recommend a rate surcharge to
be imposed on BPA customers failing to meet the model conservation
standards. The amount of the surcharge is to reflect the additional
costs to BPA by the customer's failure to achieve the projected energy savings attributable to the standards, but must be at least ten
percent and not more than fifty percent of BPA's rates.28
B.

The Council's Plan

The Council's Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan
made conservation the centerpiece of its regional electric blueprint
" 16 U.S.C. § 839b(b).
2, Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan, supra note 16.
16 U.S.C. § 839b(f)(1).
'6
Id. § 839b(f)(1). The Act defined "cost effective" resources as those resources forecast "to
be reliable and available. . . to meet or reduce the electric power demand. . . of the consumers. . . at an estimated incremental system cost no greater than that of the least-cost, similarly
reliable and available alternative measure or resource, or combination thereof." Id. §
839a(4)(A). The Act also defined "system cost" as an estimate of all direct costs of a measure or
resource over its effective life including [direct and quantifiable environmental costs and benefits]. Id. § 839a(4)(B). The Act did not define the term "economically feasible," but several
courts have construed the term in other contexts to sanction burdensome requirements, resulting in reduced profits, even bankruptcy for some firms, but not drive an entire industry out of
business. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 530 n.55 (1981) (feasibility standards do not permit cost-benefit decision making, but are not intended to drive an
industry out of business); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971)
(limits of feasibility not reached unless there are "truly unusual factors present" or the cost
reached "extraordinary magnitudes"); American Fed. of Labor v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 122-23
(3d Cir. 1975) ("Standards may be economically feasible even though, from the standpoint of
employers, they are financially burdensome and affect profit margins adversely. Nor does the
concept of economic feasibility necessarily guarantee the continued existence of individual employers." But "practical considerations can temper protective requirements"); American Iron
and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (While a massive dislocation is unacceptable, a 13% drop in earnings is not "infeasible").
27

16 U.S.C. § 839b(f)(2).

28 Id.
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and made model conservation standards for new residential and commercial structures the cornerstone of its conservation program.2 9 The
plan included four different electric growth forecasts for the succeeding twenty years. The "low growth" forecast could be met with
conservation only, while under the other three forecasts electric demand would be met by a combination of conservation, hydropower,
cogeneration, coal, and combustion turbines. a0 The "high growth"
scenario (which the Council estimated to have a twenty-two percent
probability of occurrence) would require a coal plant producing electricity at slightly over four cents per kilowatt hour (kwh) to meet
demand.31 Thus, the Council's plan considered any conservation measure with a marginal cost of less than four cents per kwh to be "cost
effective." ' 2 Although the marginal cost of a particular conservation
measure could be four cents per kwh and still be cost effective under
its definition, the Council estimated that the average cost of "costeffective" conservation measures at 1.8 cents per kwh. 3
The Council estimated that meeting the model standards would
save the region fourteen percent of the cost of meeting electric
growth under its high growth scenario, and thirty-six percent under
its low growth scenario, over the next twenty years. The Council also
estimated that meeting the standard for new residential homes would
cost from $2,400 to $4,500 per home, depending on the climate zone.
It concluded, however, that a home meeting the standard would cost
less to own and operate over its lifetime than would a home built to
current standards.3 '
II. THE SUIT
A. The Petitioner'sArguments
The Seattle Master Builders' Association, along with a number of
29 Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan, supra note 16, at 10-9 to 10-11, 10-13
to 10-14. On October 31, 1984 the Council recommended that BPA impose surcharges in areas
where states or political subdivisions did not adopt the model standards (or measures achieving
comparable savings) by January 1, 1986.
Id. at 5-2 (and figures 5-1 to 5-4).

Id. at 5-17 (and figures 5-13, 5-14, and 7-1).
Id.
Id.
avoided
number

at 7-1.
at 10-4. Marginal cost is the cost of the last unit of output, the cost that would be
by producing one unit less. Average cost is the total cost of production divided by the
of units produced. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALvSIS OF LAW 8, 111 (3d ed. 1986).
' See Northwest Power Planning Council, 2 NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS No. 2 at 6-8 (Mar.Apr. 1983); see also Eckman & Watson, Model ConservationStandards For New Construction:
The Region's Best Buy, 1 NORTHWEST ENVTL. J. no. 2 at 23 (1985).
33
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other homebuilders' associations and developmental interests, 5 challenged the Council's model conservation standards for new residential construction as arbitrary and in violation of a number of Northwest Power Act provisions. They argued that the Council's four cents
per kwh definition of "cost-effective" conservation was unreasonable
because it was based on a high growth forecast which was unlikely to
occur. The homebuilders contended that the Council must base its
model conservation standards on a scenario "more likely than not" to
s6
occur.
The Master Builders and their colleagues also contended that the
Council's definition of cost-effective conservation violated the Act because it was based on the average cost of a package of conservation
measures, not on the cost of each individual conservation measure. s
Similarly, they objected to the Council's definition of the economic
feasibility of the standards, which considered the cost and efficiency
of standards as a whole. The petitioners alleged that economic feasibility had to be measured on a component-by-component basis; in
other words, each particular conservation measure had to save the
consumer more in electricity than it cost to install. Further, because
the Council based economic feasibility on the marginal cost of electricity, not on average electric costs, the homebuilders argued that
the conservation standards were only "theoretically feasible, and
therefore unreasonable. 3 8
The Council determined the effectiveness of the conservation measures based on computer simulations and industry standards rather
than by testing the components in the field. The petitioners' final
statutory challenge alleged that the Act required the Council to conduct component field testing to determine the value of various conservation measures. They claimed that such testing was feasible in
" Joining the Master Builders as petitioners were the Homebuilders Association of Spokane,
the National Woodwork Manufacturers Association, the Fir and Hemlock Door Association,
Shelter Development Corp., Clair W. Daines, Inc., Conner Development Company, Donald N.
McDonald, Seattle Door Company, and the Homebuilders Association of Washington State.
Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1359. The Pacific Legal Foundation submitted an amicus brief
supporting the petitioners, as did the Salmon River Electric Coop.
The federal government intervened on the side of the Council (but see infra § II.B). Amicus
briefs supporting the Council were submitted by the states of California, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington, the city of Tacoma, the National Governors' Association, and the Northwest Conservation Act Coalition.
" See Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1368.
" Id. This contention was based on 16 U.S.C. § 839a(4)(A), referring to the cost effectiveness
of "any measure or resource."
" Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1369. On the difference between marginal costs and average
costs, see supra note 33. On the meaning of economic feasibility, see supra note 26.
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the two-year time frame in which the Council had to develop its plan
and would have produced valuable data. Therefore, they charged that
the Council's use of industry engineering standards and computer
simulations of energy use, instead of field testing, was an abuse of
discretion. 9
In addition to their statutory claims, the Master Builders charged
that the Council is actually a federal agency, despite congressional
declarations to the contrary, because it is authorized under a federal
statute. 40 If a federal agency, the petitioners argued that the Council
was unconstitutionally constituted, since its members were not appointed in accordance with the appointments clause of the U.S. Constitution.4 1 They also alleged that the Council was a federal agency,
not an interstate compact agency,4 2 because the Council received congressional approval before the states agreed to form it, and because
its actions directly affect the federal BPA. 3
Even if the Council were a valid compact agency, the petitioners
argued that the appointment of Council members still had to satisfy
the appointments clause, because the Council exercises significant
authority over the federal government. According to the petitioners'
44
interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo,
the appointment of any official "exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States" must satisfy appointment
clause requirements. 45 They therefore contended that state appointment of Council members was unconstitutional.
The homebuilders' constitutional claims were more threatening to
the Council than their statutory allegations because the constitutional claims challenged the authority of the Council to affect actions
39 Master Builders, 786 F.2d at 1370. The petitioners also claimed that the Council violated
the Washington and Montana environmental policy acts by not preparing an environmental
assessment on the model conservation standards. See id. at 1371.
,0 Id. at 1362-63.

Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 states:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the
Congress may by law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3 provides that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress
...
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State. . ." See generally Frankfurter
& Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution - A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34
YALE L.J. 685 (1925); F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS (1961).
,1 See Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1364.
' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
11 Id. at 126.
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of the federal BPA. By implication, this threat extended to other federal agencies which are required to take Council actions into account,
such as the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission."'
B.

The Curious Position of BPA

The constitutional issues raised by the Master Builders' suit
caused BPA and its parent agency, the Department of Energy, 4 7 to

ask the U.S. Justice Department to intervene in the case in January
1985, eighteen months after the petitioners filed suit."8 The Energy
Department urged the Justice Department to adopt a position that a
Council with more than advisory powers was unconstitutional.49
BPA's position was that the court should strike down only those provisions of the Northwest Power Act authorizing the Council to constrain BPA activities. 0
The governors of the four Northwest states took issue with BPA's
position, stating in a sharply worded letter that the BPA and Energy
Department positions amounted to "a distinction without a difference." Their letter reminded BPA that there would have been no
Northwest Power Act without a strong role for the states through the
Council. The governors also charged BPA and the Energy Department with
seeking "to overturn the bargain to which all of us were
'1
party."9

See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii).
At the time the Master Builders' suit was filed, the Secretary of Energy was former BPA
Administrator, Don Hodel, now Secretary of the Interior.
48 See 5 NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS no. 3 (Apr.-May 1986) at 3.
49Letter of Donald Hodel, Secretary of Energy, to Rex Lee, Solicitor General (Jan. 7, 1985),
transmitting a legal memorandum by Theodore Garrish, the Energy Department's General
Counsel (noting that, while the Council seemed to recognize that the rate surcharge for failing
to meet its model conservation standards was only advisory, the Council maintained it could
use BPA's failure to follow its regional power plan to veto BPA's acquisition of major resources;
and concluding that "as a matter of policy, any funding which subordinates BPA to the will of
the Council is both constitutionally and practically intolerable").
'o See Northwest Power Planning Council, 5 NORTHWEST ENERGY NEWS no. 3 (Apr.-May
1986) at 3.
51 Letter of Governors Victor Atiyeh (Oregon), John Evans (Idaho), Booth Gardner (Washington) and Ted Swinden (Montana) to Peter Johnson, BPA Administrator (Feb. 5, 1985). The
governors concluded:
The Congress and the Governors of the Northwest states put together a careful balance of regional and federal authority in the Northwest Power Act. The balance of
authority is the essence of the constitutional principle of federalism and is clearly
consistent with the compact clause of the U.S. Constitution. A sharing of federal and
state authorities will best serve the ratepayers of the Northwest as we all wrestle with
the difficult problems surrounding our energy future.
Id. at 2. On the nature of the "bargain" in the Northwest Power Act, see the Symposia cited
'

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978488

10

JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND POLICY

[Vol. 8

The Justice Department responded by intervening on the side of
the Council but urging the court to avoid reaching the constitutional
issues. Its brief (which BPA lawyers helped write) termed the appointments clause "a difficult constitutional issue," and noted that
the surcharge penalty for failing to adopt the model standard was
only a recommendation to BPA, not sufficient to constitute an exercise of "significant authority" for appointments clause purposes."2
However, the federal brief conceded that two other Northwest Power
Act provisions raised appointments clause issues: (1) the Act's prohibition increased industrial power sales without a determination by
the Council of consistency with its regional conservation and electric
power plan; and (2) the preclusion of BPA's acquisition of major electric generating resources or conservation programs which are inconsistent with the Council's plan, unless BPA receives congressional approval.53 The federal brief also disputed the Council's contention that
the appointments clause is directed only at preventing congressional
arrogation of Executive power, alleging that "the Framers had a clear
intent to preclude state as well as congressional appointments."5 4 Although the Justice Department claimed that "a substantial issue
under the appointments clause is raised" by the two provisions mentioned above, it concluded that the Council's model conservation
standards and its recommended rate surcharge did not implicate the
appointments clause issue; therefore, the Justice Department urged
the court to avoid the constitutional issue.55
Thus, BPA apparently convinced the Justice Department to walk a
narrow line: to support the Council, but urge the court to avoid the
supra note 9.
" Brief for the United States at 8-11, 18, Seattle Master Builders' Ass'n v. Northwest Power
Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986).
"SSee Brief for the United States, supra note 52, at 13, 17-18 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 839c(d)(3)
and 839d(c)(3)). The federal brief refused to concede that § 4(h)(10)(A) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. §
839b(h)(10)(A), which requires BPA to act "in a manner consistent" with the Council's fish and
wildlife program bound BPA to the program, because that provision also requires BPA to act
consistent with "the purposes of [the] Act." According to the federal brief, this requires BPA
"to balance its fish and wildlife protection responsibility with its responsibility to provide an
adequate, efficient, economical and reliable power supply." Id. at 14-15. If upheld, this interpretation would enable BPA to override the Council's fish and wildlife program. However, this
argument essentially amounts to a contention that the Council is an advisory body, an issue not
reached by the majority (see infra note 71 and accompanying text) but a conclusion squarely
rejected by the dissent (see infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text).
Id. at 18-19 (citing a motion defeated at the Constitutional Convention that would have
allowed federal appointments to be made by "the Legislatures or Executives of the several
states" (see infra note 122), a statement by Gouvernor Morris, and Federalist Papers Nos. 15
and 16).
55 Id.
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constitutional issue. By charting such a course, BPA avoided the politically unpopular position of opposing the Council, while nevertheless refusing to concede the Council's authority over BPA.
III.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION

Despite the arguments of the Justice Department, the Ninth Circuit reached the constitutional issues. Writing for himself and Judge
Schroeder, Judge Goodwin upheld the Council as a constitutional interstate compact agency, exempt from appointments clause requirements. He also ruled for the Council on the statutory provisions at
issue. Judge Beezer dissented on the constitutional question; he
would have subjected the Council to appointments clause
requirements.
A. The Constitutional Issues
The court had little difficulty rejecting the petitioners' first constitutional claim-that the Council was not a valid interstate compact
agency, but rather a federal agency. Deferring to the express language
of the statute, as well as its legislative history, the court ruled that
the Council is not a federal agency because Congress said it was not. 6
Terming a federal Council "a rejected second choice," the court
noted that Congress wanted a non-federal Council to represent state
concerns in regional electric power and fish and wildlife issues and
did not wish to create another federal agency.57 A non-federal Council authorized by a federal statute would avoid conflicts with state
law, maintain accountability through the application of federal substantive and procedural law, and avoid the constitutional problems
accompanying a federal agency composed of state appointees."
Judge Goodwin rejected the petitioners' allegations that the Council was not an interstate compact agency because Congress gave approval to the Council before the states agreed to form it, and because
its actions directly affect the federal BPA. He ruled that the Council
satisfied all the Supreme Court-created tests for a compact agency,"
56 Master Builders', 786 F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied No. 83-7585 (July 8,
1986) cert. denied. 107 S.Ct. 939 (1987) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 839b(b), 126 CONG. Rac. 30,186,
30,181, 29,808 (1980) (remarks of Sen. McClure, Sen. Hatfield and Rep. Dingell); H.R. REP. No.
96-976 (Part II), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (majority views), 70-71 (supplemental views of Rep.
Williams) (1980)).
'
Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1363.
Id. cf. supra note 22.
" Id. The court observed that there are four indicia of compacts: (1) a joint organization for
regulatory purposes; (2) conditional consent by member states which are not free to modify or
repeal their participation unilaterally; (3) state enactments requiring reciprocal action to be
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that "unusual features" of a compact do not invalidate it,6" and that
prior congressional consent and direct effects on federal agency were
not in fact "unusual features" of compacts.61 He also noted that there
is nothing wrong with the federal government agreeing to be bound
if Congress decides to do so in a clear and unambiguous
to state 6law,
2
manner.
The court also rejected the petitioners' second constitutional attack: that even if a valid compact agency, the Council had to meet
appointments clause requirements (that is, be appointed by the President, a department head, or the courts) because it exercises significant authority over the federal government. Basically, the petitioners
interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, which
struck down the original Federal Election Commission for violating
the appointments clause, to impose a single, functional test for determining which officials must meet appointments clause requirements:
any appointee exercising "significant authority pursuant to the laws
of the United States."' s Because of the numerous provisions in the
Northwest Power Act giving the Council authority to constrain BPA
actions,64 the petitioners argued that Council members possessed
"significant authority" under federal law, and therefore were subject
to the appointments clause.65
However, the Ninth Circuit did not consider the applicability of
the appointments clause to depend on a single test because it felt
such a test "would virtually outlaw all compacts.

... 6 Instead, the

effective; and (4) an increase in the political power of the states at the expense of the federal
government (citing Northeast Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 105
S. Ct. 2545, 2554 (1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981); United States Steel v.
Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978)).
00 Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1364. The court noted that compacts have always encouraged new, innovative solutions to problems, quoting Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 42,
at 688.
03 Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1364 (citing examples of prior congressional approval, federal involvement in compacts, and delegation of federal authority to compacts). See also Goble,
supra note 6, at 32-35.
62 Master Builders', 786 F.2d 1364 (citing examples from federal air and water quality statutes, reclamation law, and public land law). See also Goble, supra note 6, at 55-60 (discussing
the plenary congressional authority to waive the Federal Supremacy under the property clause
of the constitution, art. IV, § 3, cl.2).
68 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) ("... any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States' and must, therefore, be appointed
[pursuant to the appointments clause]").
See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
" Master Builders' 786 F.2d at 1365.
Id. ("... because all or most [compacts] impact federal activities and all or most of them
have members appointed by participating states"). Cf. Goble supra note 6 at 37-38 (cautioning
against imposing formalities that would "reduce the flexibility that has been the hallmark of
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court read the clause to apply to appointees only if they satisfy three
conditions: (1) be executive or administrative officers, (2) serve pursuant to federal law, and (3) exercise significant authority over federal actions.6 7 Because the court concluded that the Council members
do not "serve pursuant to federal law," it ruled the Council was not
subject to the appointments clause.
While the Council's decisions must satisfy the substantive and procedural requirements of the federal Northwest Power Act, that Act
did not create the Council-it merely authorized the states to create
the Council. 8 The court noted that "[w]ithout substantive state legislation, there would be no Council and no Council members to appoint." 69 Moreover, "the Council members' appointment, salaries,
and administrative operations are pursuant to the individual laws of
the four individual states. ' 70 Because it determined that the Council
members did not serve pursuant to federal law, the court declined to
rule as to whether they exercise significant executive or administrative authority over federal activities.7 1
The Ninth Circuit bolstered its constitutional conclusion by explaining that the purpose of the appointments clause was to maintain
the separation of powers between the federal executive and federal
legislative branches, noting the Founders' fear that Congress would
7
aggrandize itself at the expense of the President and the courts. 1
Judge Goodwin distinguished the Buckley case on the grounds that
in the Northwest Power Act, Congress was "not arrogating to itself
powers that would otherwise be exercised by the President. 7 3 He
concluded, "[b]ecause Congress neither appoints nor removes the
members of this Council, the balance of powers between Congress
interstate compacts").
67 Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 126-27 and n.162).
" 16 U.S.C. §§ 839b(a)(2) ["... there shall be established a regional agency known as the
'Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Council' which ... shall not be considered
as an agency or instrumentality of the United States. .. .The appointment of six initial members, subject to applicable state law, by June 30, 1981, shall constitute an agreement by the
States establishing the Council and such agreement is hereby consented to by the Congress
... J."];
id. § 839b(1)(3) ["The members and officers and employees of the Council shall not be
deemed to be officers or employees of the United States for any purpose .... The compensation of the members shall be fixed by State law ..
69Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1365.
70 Id. See also supra note 68.
"' Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1365. The dissent found that the Act conferred significant
authority over BPA, see infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
72 Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1365 (citing Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374
(D.D.C. 1986). See A. DE TOQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (1945 ed.) (founders' fear
of a tyranny of the legislature).
's Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1365.
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and the President is unaffected." 74 Thus, he found no appointments
or compacts clause violation but simply "an innovative system of cooperative federalism under which the states, within limits provided in
the Act, can represent their shared interests in the maintenance and
development of a power supply75 in the Pacific Northwest and in related environmental concerns.

B.

The Statutory Issues

Due to the nature of the facts of the case, the court's construction
of the Northwest Power Act provisions is of more limited interest
than its holding on the constitutional issues. Nevertheless, the court's
statutory construction establishes some principles that will likely affect subsequent administrative and judicial interpretation of the
statute.
First, the court determined that the Council's interpretation of the
Act was entitled to a deferential standard of review, one similar to
that which the courts have applied to BPA's interpretations of the
Act. 76 Under the standard the court adopted, Council decisions will

not be reversed judicially if they are "reasonable." The courts will
not reverse the Council simply because they would have adopted a
different course of action.77 Interestingly, BPA, through the Justice
Department brief, urged the court to establish a more exacting standard of review.7 8 The court ignored this suggestion.
74

Id.

71 Id. at

1366; cf. infra text accompanying notes 98-99 (the dissent's refusal to consider federalism implications).
70 Id. (citing ALCOA v. Central Lincoln PUD, 467 U.S. 380 (1984); Dep't of Water and
Power v. BPA, 759 F.2d 684, 690-91 (9th Cir. 1985); Central Lincoln PUD v. Johnson, 673 F.2d
1076, 1078, as amended, 686 F.2d 708, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1982); Columbia Basin Land Protection
Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 586, 599-600 (9th Cir. 1981)).
7 Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1366 ("the preparation and consideration of the plan is a
matter within Council authority over which the Act accords the Council considerable flexibility.
For the same reason that we defer to BPA expertise in construing other sections of the Act,
therefore, we will defer to the Council's interpretation of § 839b [the provision authorizing the
Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan and the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program] if reasonable"). See also id. at 1366 (reasonableness standard appropriate where statutory construction is a contemporaneous construction by an entity charged with implementing
a statute whose provisions were "untried and new").
78 See Brief for the United States, supra note 52, at 18 ("Since the issues ...
are of a purely
legal nature, the court's review is de novo" [meaning the court could reverse the Council if it
simply disagreed with its interpretation]). The federal brief also suggested that where BPA and
the Council disagreed over how to interpret the Act, the court should adopt BPA's interpretation for four reasons: (1) BPA, "not the Council ... is charged with actually administering the
statutes pertaining to the Columbia River Power System, including the Northwest Power Act"
(alleging that "the Council has a more detached function, primarily of a planning nature"); (2)
there must be a "clear congressional mandate, specific congressional action" subjecting federal
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Second, using this standard of review, the court deferred to the
Council's interpretations of the statutory requirements that its model
conservation standards be "cost-effective" for the region and "economically feasible" for consumers.79 Relying on the inherent uncertainties in forecasting, the court ruled the Council's interpretation of
"cost-effective" conservation (any conservation measure with a marginal cost less than four cents per kwh in current dollars) to be reasonable.80 The court also used the reasonableness standard to sanction the Council's approach to judging the cost effectiveness of a
package of conservation measures as a whole, not requiring each individual component to be cost effective."1 Similarly, the court determined that the Council's definition of "economically feasible," which
relied on marginal electric costs instead of average costs, was "not
unreasonable. "82
Third, the court rejected the petitioners' allegation that the technical, analytic process the Council employed to arrive at its model conservation standards was unreasonable because it failed to conduct
component field testing. Noting the silence of the Act as to testing
methodology, the technical nature of such a decision, and the deferential standard of judicial review of Council decisions, the Ninth Circuit sustained the Council's methodology of using industry engineering standards and computer simulation models as being within the
Council's discretion.8"
Finally, Judge Goodwin rejected the petitioners' allegation that the
Council violated the Montana and Washington environmental policy
acts by failing to perform environmental assessments on the model
conservation standards.8 4 He ruled that, as a compact agency, the
Council is subject only to those state laws expressly reserved in the
officers to state directives; (3) the court should avoid statutory interpretations raising constitutional issues; and (4) BPA's interpretation of its responsibilities is entitled to "great weight").
Id. at 16-17.

" 16 U.S.C. § 839b(f)(1).
"0Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1368 ("the Act does not require the Council to follow any
particular method or timetable for forecasting the amount or cost of future energy demand; we
do not find the 20-year forecast or the four cents per kwh cut-off to be unreasonable in light of
the inherent indefiniteness of long-term energy forecasting").
81 Id. at 1369; cf. supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (petitioners' arguments).
" Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1369 (also citing legislative history in support of basing cost
comparisons on marginal costs).
"' Id. at 1370 ("The methodology used in the 1983 plan employed accepted industry standards and principles of analysis .... Petitioners have not presented evidence before this court
to raise serious doubt about the accuracy or reliability [of the Council's methodology]").
84

See supra note 39.
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legislation creating the Council.85 Since neither state made such a
reservation, these state statutes do not apply to the Council.86 This
determination culminated a thoroughgoing victory for the Northwest
Power Planning Council.
C.

The Dissent

Judge Beezer filed a dissent that raised doubts as to whether the
Council was an interstate compact agency and concluded that, even if
it was, its members had to be appointed consistent with appointments clause requirements. He found that the Council "lacks several
of the classic indicia of an interstate compact. 8 7 These included (1)
the facts that none of the Northwest states conditioned their agreement to participate in the Council on action by the other states, and
all the states are free to repeal their statutes unilaterally; (2) the consent of only three of the four states was necessary to establish the
Council, meaning that the Council could have substantial effects in a
nonmember state; (3) the "region" served by BPA includes small
parts of Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and California, states not represented on the Council; and (4) the Council serves no state purpose,
because it has no responsibility for coordinating energy and conservation planning on the state level, and its purpose of constraining the
actions of the federal BPA is "not a legitimate function of an interstate compact."8 8 Judge Beezer concluded that "[b]ecause the Council has a federal purpose and receives its authority from federal law,
the Council is a federal agency" subject to the appointments clause. 89
Even if the Council were an interstate compact agency, the dissent
concluded that it was subject to the appointments clause. Noting
that the appointments clause is a grant of power to the executive and
a check on legislative authority, Judge Beezer wrote that
"[c]ongressional authority would be enhanced at the expense of the
83Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1371 (citing People v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 466 F.
Supp. 527, 537 (E.D. Cal. 1978)).
" Id. (also noting that "[nleither BPA nor the Council has taken a substantial federal action
affecting the human environment which might trigger application of federal environmental
laws").
" Id.
at 1372 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1372-73. On the issue of the Council's potential affect on nonmember states, note
that the Supreme Court, in Arizona v. California 283 U.S. 423 (1931), upheld the Colorado
River Compact even though only six of the seven basin states ratified it. See generally, Meyers
The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966).
8 Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1373 ("At best, the Council can be characterized as a federal
agency created through the interstate compact process. At worst, the Council is a federal
agency with its members appointed by the state governors. Under either approach, the Council
is not exempt from the requirements of the Appointments Clause.").
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executive if Congress had the unrestricted power to confer appointment authority on third parties."9 0 Conversely, he noted that the
compacts clause is not a grant of power either to the states or to
Congress; instead, it is a prohibition with an exception. The clause
does not expressly give Congress the power to create interstate compacts; it simply authorizes congressional consent to them.9 1 Therefore, he concluded that the compacts clause was not an exception to
the appointments clause: "Congress lacks the constitutional authority
to delegate [the appointment power] to the States."9
Applying the appointments clause to the Council, the dissent
found that the method of selecting the Council members was unconstitutional. To Judge Beezer, the applicability of the appointments
clause was a function of an officer's power and authority, not whether
Congress declared the office to be a federal one. Thus, the only pertinent test was whether Council members exercise "significant authority" under federal law.9 3 Applying this test, Judge Beezer had little
difficulty in concluding that the Northwest Power Act conferred significant authority: "[t]he ability to issue a plan with which the BPA
must act consistently constitutes significant authority pursuant to
federal law."9 4 He also found several other provisions of the Act to
confer significant authority over BPA 5
The dissent distinguished the Council from other state officials
who exercise authority under federal law, such as state officials who
spend federal funds, state court judges, and state legislators. According to the dissent, this group of officials do not exercise significant
federal authority, cannot create federal law, or have no authority to
regulate federal agencies. Judge Beezer reiterated that the Council
was not an ordinary interstate compact because it was not created for
"4 Id. at 1374 ("[tlo the extent that a governor can appoint a member of an interstate compact who would otherwise be subject to the Appointments Clause, the power of the executive is
diminished").
91 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art I., § 10, cl. 3, supra note 41).
Id.
I2

Id. at 1375 (citing Buckley, at 125-26, "We think that ... any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States,'
and must therefore be appointed [consistent with the appointments clause]").
" Id. at 1375 (relying on 16 U.S.C. § 839b(d)(2)).
98 Id. at 1375-76 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 839b(i) and (j)-the Council's authority to review BPA
actions for consistency with its plan and to compel a BPA response that is judicially reviewable;
id. § 839d(c)-the Council's authority to block BPA acquisition of major generating resources
or conservation measures inconsistent with its plan; id. § 839c(d)-the Council's authority to
limit the amount of power sold to BPA's industrial customers; id. § 839b(f)(2)-the Council's
authority to recommend rate surcharges to BPA for customers in areas not meeting model conservation standards; without such a recommendation, BPA cannot impose a surcharge).
3
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a state purpose, and it has control over the actions of a federal
agency. 6 He, therefore, felt that declaring the Council unconstitutional would not affect other interstate compacts or require presidential appointment of other state officials."
Judge Beezer was also unsympathetic to the Council's suggestions
that its constitutionality should be affirmed for policy reasons. The
Council argued that the Northwest Power Act, as an innovative program of cooperative federalism, serves the Framers' intent in drafting
the appointments clause: to prevent accumulation of power in one
branch of government.9 But the dissent felt that such a policy argument lacked "a basis in the text of the Constitution" and concluded
that "Congress has usurped the constitutionally delegated power of
the executive branch by authorizing the state governors to appoint
the members of the Council." 9 Consequently, he would have vacated
the Council's Northwest Conservation Electric Power Plan (and presumably its Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program as well). 00
IV. EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

Judge Beezer's vigorous dissent may cast some doubt on the precedential value of the majority's ruling. He seems to look more carefully at the text of the appointments and compacts clauses, 10 ' and his
single function test for the appointments clause appears consistent
with Supreme Court dicta in the Buckley case.10 2 On the other hand,
the majority's new three-part test 03 is an expansion of the Buckley
reasoning. The relative strength of the dissent gave short-lived hope
0
to those who wanted to see the decision overturned on appeal.1 4
However, upon closer inspection the majority's result is a justifiable one, while the dissent's reasoning is suspect. For example, the
dissent claimed that there is no support in the text of the Constitution for allowing Congress to authorize the states to appoint the
" Id. at 1376-77.
'

Id. at 1376.

Brief for the Northwest Power Planning Council at 63-64, Seattle Master Builders' Ass'n
v. Northwest Power Planning Council, No. 83-7585 (9th Cir.)
Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1377-78 (also drawing analogies to Supreme Court decisions
striking down the legislative veto and confining the scope of the emergency powers doctrine,
despite countervailing policies).
I" Id. at 1378.
101See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
98

'0' See supra note 93.

101See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
104 Those hopes were dashed on January 20, 1987 when the Supreme Court denied the
Master Builders' petition for certiorari, 107 S.Ct. 939 (1987).
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members of an "extraordinary" compact agency. °5 Yet, there is also
no support in the text of the Constitution for the notion that the
appointments clause applies to all officials exercising "significant authority" under federal law. That proposition was established by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the appointments clause in Buckley. 0 6 Because Buckley did not involve the federalism issues raised
by the Master Builders' case, further interpretation of the clause is
likely, especially in view of its potential implications for other compact agencies or state officials charged with implementing federal
law.
A fundamental purpose of the appointments clause is to guard
against concentration of executive and legislative powers in the same
hands. 10 7 Thus, while Congress may establish federal offices, it may
not appoint federal officers.1 08 This reflection of the Framers' conception of separation of powers' 0 9 was reaffirmed in Buckley, where the
Court made it clear that Congress may not vest the power of appointment in itself."10 Because neither Buckley nor the Framers' considered the question of gubernatorial appointment, a "structural" analysis of the issue would seem to be appropriate."' Such an analysis
would fault the dissent for failing to recognize that, structurally, the
same safeguards against concentration of powers exist whether the
federal executive or the state governors possess the power to appoint
officials to offices Congress authorizes. Thus, the courts ought to be
much more deferential to congressional choices where Congress employs the federal structure to maintain the constitutional scheme of
separated powers.
There are other weaknesses in the dissent's reasoning. Judge
Beezer thought the Council was extraordinary because it was not creSee supra text accompanying note 99.
'" See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
107

See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 392 (1986)

(hereinafter STONE); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 1042-43 (1975).
10I See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928) (Philippine legislature could not
constitutionally provide for legislative appointment to executive agencies).
'10 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249 (3d ed. 1986) (final draft
of appointments was "probably a compromise, part of the framers' larger effort to balance
power among the three branches of government").
11 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122-24.
See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969)
(method of inference from the structures and relationships created by the Constitution), reviewed by Blasi, Creativity and Legitimacy in ConstitutionalLaw, 80 YALE L.J. 176 (1970); cf.
infra text accompanying note 141 (Chief Justice Burger's reasoning in Bowsher v. Synar).
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ated for "a state purpose.""' Yet, it is evident that both the states
and Congress considered the Council to be serving the interests of
the states."' It is not all clear why the dissent believed the purpose
of the Council should be a matter for the courts, not Congress, to
decide.
Similarly, Judge Beezer seemed confident that other state officials
responsible for interpreting, applying, and enforcing federal law are
distinguishable from the Council, largely on the rather wooden distinction that they do not "create" federal law." 4 He failed to elucidate why the Council "creates" federal law but a state court judge
interpreting a federal statute or constitutional provision does not. He
also failed to explain why, for example, Congress may delegate the
authority to the states to veto federal licenses producing discharges
of water pollutants" 5 but cannot empower the Council to constrain
BPA power acquisitions, industrial power sales, or fish and wildlife
initiatives.
A close reading of the text of the appointments clause yields more
support for the majority's reasoning than for the dissent's. The pertinent language is:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . .all other Officers of the

United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress

may by law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
deem proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments." 6

The real question raised in the Master Builders' suit, one not directly addressed in either the majority or dissenting opinions, is:
what are the criteria for determining who is an "officer of the United
States," and who should decide-Congress or the courts? The majority's three-part test allowed Congress to decide that the Council was
not composed of "officers of the United States" by making appointment and removal of Council members matters of state law." 7 There-

"

See supra notes 88, 96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 22, 51.
See supra text between notes 95 and 96.

See § 401(d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d); Goble, supra note 6, at 57-59
(citing other examples of federal waivers of supremacy in public land law).
"'

U.S. CONST. art II,

§

2, cl.2.

Cf. Brief of the Northwest Power Planning Council, supra note 98, at 64-66 (Council
members are "officers of the United States" because their appointment and removal are not
subject to federal control).
1"
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fore, the Council was not "established by [federal] law." '

Overlook-

ing apparent Supreme Court authority to the contrary,1 1 9 the
dissent's test would not allow Congress to limit "officers of the
United States" to those whose appointment and removal are subject
to executive control under federal law.
Phrasing the issue is easier than resolving it. Fundamentally, the
question should turn on the intent of the Framers in drafting the
appointments clause. Was their purpose to prevent power concentrations, as the Council argued120 and as the text of the clause seems to
imply, 21 by sharing the federal appointment power among all three
branches? Or was their purpose to protect the power of the President
from congressional encroachment? Both the majority and the dissent
could be criticized for not examining the constitutional history of the
appointments clause. The outcome of an appeal could well have
turned on what this history revealed. 22
The Council's brief alleged that the debates at the constitutional
convention indicated a reluctance to grant the President power over
all appointments. The Council noted James Madison's wish that federal judges be appointed neither by (the too numerous) Congress nor
by the Executive, instead suggesting appointment by the Senate. 2 Actually, the overriding concern of the Framers was to separate the
18

See Implementing Parity, supra note 15, at 357-58 n.333.

A century ago the Supreme Court stated that unless a person holds his position by virtue
of appointment by the President, the courts, or department heads as authorized by law, he is
not an officer of the United States. United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307 (1888). See
Goble, supra note 6, at 42-44 (discussing Mouat and related cases).
110See supra text accompanying note 98.
311 See supra text accompanying note 116 ("officers of the United States" may be appointed
"'

by the President subject to advice and consent of the Senate or may be appointed by the President alone, the courts, or department heads); see also Brief of the Northwest Power Planning
Council, supra note 98, at 64 ("... Appointments Clause was not born out of a special desire
that the federal executive have an exclusive prerogative to appoint all officers exercising some
power appurtenant to federal law, so as to enhance its power. This is clear from the very fact
that the clause authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint inferior officers in the federal
courts").
"'
The federal brief did include some history; see supra note 54. Judge Beezer incorporated
this history into amended footnote 3 of his dissent. Master Builders', 786 F.2d at 1374 n.3
(citing 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 406, 418-19 (rev. ed.
1966)). However, note the reason given by James Wilson for the rejection of language that
would have provided for state appointment of federal officers was that the states might effectively block enactment of federal legislation unless Congress delegated appointment power to
the states. Id. at 406. This fear seems quaintly anachronistic in the wake of a half century of
mushrooming federal social and economic legislation, occasioned in large measure by the lifting
of judicial restraints imposed in the name of federalism and under the nondelegation doctrine.
See, e.g., G. Stone, supra note 107, at 181-212, 365-71.
"' Brief of Northwest Power Planning Council, supra note 98, at 64 (citing 1 M. Farrand,
Records of the Federal Constitution 120 (1911)).
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power to create federal officers from the power to fill appointments to
those officers."" The British monarch held both powers, and the initial draft of the Constitution, the "Virginia plan," gave both powers
to Congress, including the authority to appoint federal judges. However, Madison objected to having judges appointed by Congress, alleging that "intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary
consequences.' 12 5 But others, like Roger Sherman, worried that vesting the appointment power in the Executive would give the monarchical powers to the President, allowing him to favor one region of
the country over others.' 2 Consequently, Madison suggested that the
(less numerous) Senate have the power to appoint judges. Later, he
modified his position, proposing that the Executive appoint judges
with the concurrence of the Senate. However, the constitutional convention initially voted to have federal judges appointed by the Senate, while giving the Executive the authority to appoint executive officials. As the concept of three separate branches of government
evolved during the constitutional convention, the convention reached
a compromise whereby offices created by Congress ("and which shall
be created by Law. . . .") would be filled with appointments nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, while reserving
to Congress the authority to vest appointment of "inferior officials"
1 27
in the President, the courts, or department heads.
Absent a clear intent of the Framers from the historical record,
policy questions should not be ignored, as the dissent urged.1 28 With
little precedent' 29 and ambiguous constitutional history, the issue of
federalism and the appointments power should not be resolved while
ignoring its contemporary effects. 8 0 In an era that has witnessed
See generally L.
DENT
"'

FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESI-

28-30 (1985).
See supra note 123.

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 131.
See L. Fisher, supra note 125, at 28-30.
I'8 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
117

...Both the majority and dissent overlooked a potential analogy between Congress authorizing state appointment of officials exercising delegated federal authority and statutory delegations of federal authority to private individuals which have passed constitutional muster. See

Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) (upholding a statute providing that agricultural commodity
production and marketing restrictions were effective only after a favorable vote of a prescribed
majority of affected farmers); United States v. Rock Royale Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533
(1939) (upholding a statute giving producers of specified commodities a veto power over marketing orders of the Secretary of Agriculture).
188 See New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6 (1959) ("[tjhe Constitution did not purport to
exhaust imagination and resourcefulness in devising fruitful interstate relationships. . . [or] to
limit the variety of arrangements which are possible through the voluntary and cooperative
actions of individual States with a view to increasing harmony within the federalism created by

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978488

NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL

1987]

widespread disillusionment with federal solutions to local and regional problems, cooperative federalism offers hope that these
problems can be addressed in more innovative ways. The Council
may represent a useful federal-state model for creative resolution of
numerous modern regional problems. If neither the Framers nor the
Court has spoken to the issue, the relationship between federalism
and the appointments power should be left to Congress.18 ' Moreover,
an opinion like the dissent's, while purporting to ignore the policy
issues at stake, has its own policy ramifications. 132 For example, the
dissent would foreclose Congress from authorizing a Colorado Basin
Compact to devise a region-wide salinity control program if its members were state-appointed and its program effective against federal
officials. It seems disingenuous to write a decision with such wideranging policy implications for federal-state relations while pretending to be oblivious to those issues.
V.

THE EFFECT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S "GRAMM-RUDMANHOLLINGS" DECISION

Some two months after the Master Builders' decision, the Supreme
Court ruled that a provision of the 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act,33 popularly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, violated the constitutional principle of separation
of powers. 13 4 The Court's July 7, 1986 opinion adds support to the
notion that the Framers' overriding intent in drafting the appointments clause was to prevent power concentrations, not to immunize
the Executive from congressional control. 1 5 The Master Builders'

case appears to be fully consistent with the rationale of the GrammRudman-Hollings decision.
The Supreme Court's Bowsher v. Synar decision struck down section 251 of the deficit control act which gave the United States
Comptroller General the authority to issue a report calling for cuts in
the Constitution").
131 If Congress may ratify what would otherwise be unconstitutional state burdens on interstate commerce (see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), Cohen; Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old
Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1983)), it ought to be able to devise a system of federal/state
relations of its own choosing to tackle Northwest electric power issues.
131 Cf.

L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

iv (1978) ("judicial authority to determine

when to defer to others in constitutional matters is a procedural form of substantive power;
judicial restraint is but another form of judicial activism").
Pub. L. No. 99-177, 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (1986).
I
Bowsher, 106 S.Ct. 3181 (1986).
's' See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
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program spending; the Act required the President to implement
these cuts in order to meet specified reductions in federal budget deficits.'3 6 Since the Comptroller General is removable only by Congress,
the Court considered him to be an officer of Congress, independent of
the Executive. 13 7 And because the Court considered his duties under
section 251 to be those of executing (interpreting) a statute, it ruled
that Congress improperly retained control over executive functions,
violating both the principle of separation of powers and the appointments clause.'
Former Chief Justice Burger's opinion emphasized heavily the role
of the divided, separated federal powers in curbing congressional
power: "[t]he declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers
of the federal government, of course, was to 'diffuse power the better
to secure liberty' ...
[T]here can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same. . . body ....
He noted the fear of the Framers over congressional aggrandizement
of power and cited debates from the first Congress, where Madison
successfully urged rejection of a congressional power of removal over
Executive Branch officers." 0 According to Justice Burger, "the Framers recognized that, in the long run, structural protection against
abuse of power were critical to preserving liberty.""' He concluded
that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act's vesting of executive functions in an official "subservient" to Congress violated this structural
2
protection."
The Supreme Court's reasoning supports the result in Master
Builders'. The Northwest Power Act's delegation of authority to the
18 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181. To achieve its goal of eliminating budget deficits by fiscal year
1991, the Act sets a "maximum deficit amount" for federal spending which gets progressively
smaller each year. If in any year the budget deficit exceeds the prescribed "maximum deficit
amount" by more than a specific sum, the Act requires across-the-board cuts in federal spending (half in defense, half in domestic programs), with certain priority programs exempted by §
255 of the Act. Under § 251 of the Act, the automatic reductions are achieved through a report
of the U.S. Comptroller General (acting on the basis of estimated budget deficits and programby-program budget reductions made by the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office). Section 252 of the Act requires the President to issue a "sequestration order," mandating the spending reductions specified by the Comptroller General unless
Congress acts within a certain amount of time. It was this authority of the Comptroller General, an official removable by Congress, over the President that the court found
unconstitutional.
37 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3189-91.
' Id. at 3192.
" Id. at 3186.
1,0 Id. at 3187.

Id. at 3191.
42

Id.
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interstate Northwest Power Planning Council furthers diffusion of
power by establishing a system of "shared power" between the federal BPA and the nonfederal Council, "3 thus reducing prospects for
centralized control. Moreover, the Act is hardly a threat of congressional aggrandizement of power: Congress has no power to remove
Council members.14 4 In fact, the Court endorsed a greater congressional role in specifying the conditions under which the President
may remove commissioners of independent agencies like the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.14 1 In contrast, the Northwest Power Act leaves removal of
Northwest Power Planning Council members up to the states. Far
from being "subservient" to Congress, Council members are wholly
independent. As a result, there is no potential for congressional aggrandizement of power, and the structural protections the Framers
14 6
thought essential to securing liberty are enhanced, not threatened.
The Constitution's scheme of separated and divided powers is entirely consistent with the "creative federalism" of the Northwest
Power Act.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Master Builders' case ratifies the important role assigned to
the Northwest Power Planning Council in Pacific Northwest electric
power planning and fish and wildlife restoration. The result fosters
the centrifugal forces the Constitution's Framers wished to set in motion through the principle of separated and divided powers by ratifying congressional power to authorize an important policymaking role
for state officials in resolving regional problems. Master Builders' is
also consistent with the Framers' overriding concern with dispersing
government power,14 as well as de Toqueville's warning that the
American experiment could be jeopardized by either the tyranny of
the Executive or a tyranny of the Congress. 8 Now that the decision
survived an appeal to the Supreme Court,4 the Northwest Power
Planning Council represents a creative innovation in federalism that
148

See Blumm, Risk Management and Northwest Electric Power Planning: Some Lessons

from the Rearview Mirror, 13 ENvTL. L. 733, 758-59 (1983).
144

See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a).

See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3188 n.4.
See Id. at 3189; cf C. Black supra note 111.
147 See supra text accompanying notes 107-11, 124-27; cf. Sherrett, supra note 6 (agreeing
with the dissent that state appointment of Council members violates appointments clause and
the separation of powers doctrine).
48 A. DE TOQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (1945
ed.).
149 Cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 939
(1987).
148
144
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may have precedential value far beyond the issues of electric power
planning or fish and wildlife restoration, or the boundaries of the Pacific Northwest. 5 '

150 See, e.g., Regional Electric Power: Hearing on H. 5766 Before the Subcomm. on Energy
Conservation and Power of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984) (hearing on a bill that would give advance congressional consent to interstate compacts to regulate electric utilities); Cavanaugh, Least-Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric
Utilities and Their Regulators, 10 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 299, 343 (1986) ("As long as utilities
retain something like their present form ...
the evolution of regional institutions is the best
hope for an effective state regulatory presence").
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